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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant Charles Rehn incorporates herein the Statement of 
Facts set forth in his Appellant's Brief filed herein, which 
completely and accurately marshals the facts, disputed and 
undisputed, which are material and relevant to the issues on 
appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE INADEQUATE AND 
REQUIRE REVERSAL AND REMAND. 
A. INSUFFICIENT FINDINGS IN DETERMINING THE 
AMOUNT OF ALIMONY. 
Mary's Brief fails to address the fatal deficiency of the 
trial court's Findings. Instead, Mary relies solely on the 
general rule that "considerable deference [should be granted] to 
the trial court due to its familiarity with the facts and the 
evidence." Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997). 
Mary claims that the trial court considered the Jones factors, as 
required by the court in Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 843 
(Utah App. 1992), in reaching its conclusions and that nothing 
more is needed. (Appellee's Brief pp.6-7) However, Mary is no 
better able than was Charles to point to facts considered by the 
trial court which show that the evidence supports the trial 
court's findings. 
As stated by this court in Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 
477-478 (Utah App. 1991), "the way to attack findings which 
appear to be complete and which are sufficiently detailed is to 
marshal the supporting evidence and then demonstrate the evidence 
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is inadequate to sustain such findings. But where the findings 
are not of that caliber, appellant need not go through a futile 
marshaling exercise. Rather, appellant can simply argue the 
legal insufficiency of the trial court's findings as framed." 
Id. 
The findings, oral and written, are not sufficiently 
detailed and do not include any subsidiary facts to disclose the 
steps employed by the trial court in reaching its ultimate 
conclusions on each factual issue. See Stevens v. Stevens, 754 
P.2d 952, 958 (Utah App. 1988). The trial court has failed to 
make any findings whatsoever to demonstrate that its findings 
were equitable and fair to Charles, as well as Mary. Charles 
cannot show that the trial court's conclusory findings are 
against the clear weight of the evidence when there are no 
findings of any underlying, basic fact for the reviewing court to 
weigh. The divorce decree cannot be properly reviewed on appeal 
or affirmed in the face of clearly insufficient findings. 
The trial court's discretion to find facts, believe or 
disregard witnesses, is premised upon an understanding that the 
findings of fact will show that the decree "follows logically 
from, and is supported by, the evidence." Smith v. Smith, 726 
P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986). Charles' concedes that the trial court 
did conclude that Mary needed Charles to pay and concluded that 
Charles had the ability to pay the ordered alimony, child 
support, debts and attorney's fees. However, there are 
undisputed facts which do not support such conclusions. There 
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are no findings to resolve the apparent contradictions. There 
are also disputed facts which the trial court makes no attempt to 
resolve though its factual findings. 
The lower court makes no findings as to the parties 
accustomed standard of living, stating only that $3,300 a month 
is reasonable for a mother and two children. However, the Jones 
decision requires the trial court find that the expenses are 
reasonable for the accustomed standard of living of the parties. 
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). Mary cites 
Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah App. 1994) for 
support of the trial court's cursory findings. However, in 
Schaumberg, the parties' standard of living, the wife's needs and 
the husband's ability to pay were not controverted. The present 
case has many controverted facts, left unresolved by the 
findings. 
1. Mary's Needs. 
Mary presents no discussion of the lack of findings 
discussing the evidence considered by the trial court in 
concluding that Mary's needs are $3300/month. 
The parties estimated Mary's need for support was 
$1300/month (over her claimed net income of $1072/month) when 
Mary and Charles agreed on a support figure at the time of 
separation. (Tr. 34-35; Add. C). Thereafter, in a motion for 
temporary relief, Mary represented to the trial court by sworn 
affidavit that her living expenses on a temporary basis were only 
$2,359/month (Add. D). Mary's testimony at trial was undisputed 
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that her needs increased on divorce by $125.00/month to 
$2,484/month because of COBRA medical insurance. However, her 
claim to have additional needs was heavily controverted by her 
own testimony and that of Charles: 
She contended at trial that she needs to work at a flexible 
job so that she would not have to work when the children 
were out of school. (Tr. 44-45). Yet she has included the 
$13 6/monthly expense of day care as a necessary expense for 
the trial court to consider in fixing her needs. (Add. B). 
During marriage the family entertainment budget was 
$217/month (Addendum A), while Mary contends her 
entertainment expenses are now $345/month (Addendum B). 
During marriage, the family budget for school and books was 
$44/month (Addendum A), while Mary contends her school 
expenses for her and the children now are $150/month. 
(Addendum B). Further, the trial court makes no finding as 
to whether it is reasonable for Mary who has two bachelor's 
degrees and an MBA in marketing to have further schooling 
expenses. 
None of the evidence which cuts against the trial court's finding 
of needs of $3300/month or shows the parties' lesser standard of 
living were explained or discussed in the findings. 
2. Mary's Ability to Earn. 
Mary's cites Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980) 
for the proposition that the trial court is not required to 
impute higher income where the mother is working part time and 
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carrying for children 4-8 years of age. However the children in 
the present case attend school full time. Fletcher is 
distinguishable from the present case in that the children in 
that case were pre-school age and the sum of alimony awarded in 
that case was only $300.00. Further, the court found that the 
husband in Fletcher had unwittingly alienated the three older 
children from their mother resulting in the court's reluctant 
order of split custody with three children residing with each 
parent. The net effect is that Ms. Fletcher was receiving total 
monthly support of $750.00 from Mr. Fletcher. (See id.). 
Mary's reliance on Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 
App. 1992) is likewise misplaced. In that case, the children at 
home were preschool age. Further, the court ordered an automatic 
reduction of alimony of $500.00 two years from the date of the 
divorce decree because the child would be in school full time 
then and Ms. Watson would be free to work. Id. Although the 
lower court mentions the ages of the children and indicates a 
finding that the mother had been the primary caretaker, the court 
does not address the real issue of Mary's earning capability. 
Finally, Mary indicates to the trial court that Mary has a 
handicap due to a tumor being removed in 1984. After this 
surgery, Mary obtained her MBA in the fall of 1984 or 1985 (Tr. 
20). Thereafter she had significant positions of responsibility 
at work including food service supervisor at Woodland Park School 
District in Colorado (Tr. 11-2) and food service supervisor in 
the Park City School District in 1991 through 1992. When the 
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oldest child was four years old Mary returned to the home because 
day care was eating up much of her income. (Tr. 14) There is no 
evidence that Mary is not able to find full time employment 
because of her handicap. 
The trial court made findings that there was no issue of 
underemployment based on the historical roles of the parties. 
(Findings paragraph 13-16). However, the historical roles of the 
parties included, Mary and Charles both working. Now the 
children are in school full time. Mary is a highly qualified 
person with two Bachelor Degrees and an M.B.A. in marketing. 
Mary has a work history of working in food administration at a 
rate of pay of over $13.00 per hour ($2253.00/month). (Tr. 13) 
Yet, she now works for an average of $6.85 an hour 
($1429.00/month). However, there is no factual finding which 
resolves the dispute as to the ability of Mary to earn sufficient 
income to meet her needs. 
3. Charles' Ability to Pay. 
Mary cites the court to Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963 (Utah at 
App. 1994) as authority for what constitutes adequate findings. 
However, the court in Hill v. Hill does not alter the following 
holding in Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991): "Failure 
to consider the Jones factors in fashioning an alimony award 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. . . . Accordingly, the trial 
court must make sufficiently detailed findings of fact on each 
factor to enable a reviewing court to ensure that the trial 
court's discretionary determination was rationally based upon 
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these three factors." Id. at 492. (citing Davis v. Davis, 749 
P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1988); Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 
(Utah App. 1988); Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 
1987)) . 
The result in Hill was that the findings were sufficient. 
However, that case had different findings and different facts. 
In Hill, the court imputed income to Mr. Hill of $2,000 a month 
rather than the $1,100 a month alleged by Mr. Hill. The court 
lowered alimony from $300/month to $100/month and in turn ordered 
Mr. Hill to pay a $2 00/month loan. In Hill the court set a 
review date for alimony two years after the divorce trial in 
anticipation of Mr. Hill's income increasing. These findings 
indicated that the court wrestled with the facts affecting Mr. 
Hill's ability to pay. However, in the present case, there is no 
indication of the process the trial court used to reach its 
conclusions. Rather, the trial court made a blanket conclusion 
that Charles has the ability to pay although there was evidence 
to the contrary. 
The trial court's finding that "Charles had the capability 
to pay alimony" (Findings f 37) without more does not allow a 
reviewing court to determine what evidence the trial court 
believed or disbelieved or how the trial court reached its 
conclusion. Charles testimony that he had living expenses of 
$3,200 a month (not including payment for attorney's fees, day 
care and revolving debt) and income of $6,833/month was 
undisputed. Charles' expert witness calculated that Charles' tax 
7 
obligations under the temporary order of the trial court were 
approximately $2,050/month. (Tr. 68-69, Add E). There was no 
counter expert testimony. Charles expenses before support are 
$5,250, leaving only $l,583/month with which to pay support. The 
trial court made no findings to resolve the evidence that Charles 
could not afford to pay $2,245 in support a month. 
Plaintiff also asserts that Charles will receive a $3 00 
benefit for paying alimony on his taxes. However, Mary has 
already accounted for the tax deductions, assuming an alimony 
award of $1600, in her income calculations for the trial court. 
(Addendum "C") . There was no findings as to the tax effect of 
the trial court's decision. 
Because the trial court has made no findings to explain 
contrary evidence and to show the subsidiary facts considered in 
reaching its alimony award, this case should be reversed and 
remanded for reconsideration of alimony and for further findings. 
B. INSUFFICIENT FINDINGS TO SUPPORT A 
DEVIATION ON THE LENGTH OF ALIMONY. 
Mary asserts that the trial court found the extenuating 
circumstances required by Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(h) "that 
justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time [than 
the length of the marriage]." Id. (Appellee's Brief p. 15). 
However, the findings of the trial court give no indication 
of extenuating circumstances. (Findings paragraph 36-38). The 
trial court considered the following: 
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a. The disparity in the abilities of the parties 
to earn income; 
b. The historical roles that both parties had 
played in this family during the 20-year marriage. 
The disparity of the parties1 incomes does not rise to the 
level of an extenuating circumstance. Mary has had significant 
positions of employment during the marriage. She has obtained an 
advanced college degree during the marriage, an MBA in marketing. 
(Tr. 19). Because Mary can provide for her own needs through her 
own abilities, the disparity in incomes does not warrant an 
exception under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (7)(h). However, the 
trial court made no findings to explain how it considered the 
evidence justified the exception under the statute. 
The trial court also failed to make any specific findings 
explaining what it found about the historical roles of the 
parties that constitutes an extenuating circumstance in light of 
contradictory facts. Mary has been employed throughout the 
marriage. Charles has had the children 45 % of the days and 
nights throughout the 18 months of the parties1 separation. (Tr. 
96-97; Add. G) . The findings do not explain why either of these 
factors 
justify a deviation from the statute. 
Mary relies on Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1992) 
to support the trial court's decision regarding permanent 
alimony. However, the Watson decision came before Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-5(7)(h) was enacted. 
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Because the trial court failed to make specific findings 
justifying permanent alimony, this case should be reversed and 
remanded for reconsideration of the term of alimony and for 
further findings justifying the trial court's deviation from the 
statute. 
C. INSUFFICIENT FINDINGS FOR A DEVIATION 
FROM THE CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES. 
Charles adamantly denies that there was any stipulation 
reached as to sole custody or to the use of the Plaintiff's 
proposed child support schedule, Exhibit 5, as argued by Mary. 
(Appellee's Brief p. 16). The record contradicts such a 
stipulation. The stipulation of the parties in the findings 
includes no reference to child support. (Findings paragraph 42) . 
Neither at the time Mr. Cathcart introduced the sole custody 
worksheet, nor at any time during the course of the trial does he 
or Mr. Christensen indicate that the parties have stipulated to 
sole custody. (Tr. 63). 
Mr. Cathcart proposed that child support be paid in 
accordance with the child support schedule, i.e. the statutory 
guidelines, which Mr. Christensen agreed to. (Tr. 5) Mr. 
Cathcart went on to propose that child support should be around 
$1,035 to $1,055. Mr. Christensen did not agree to this 
proposal. (Tr. 5) In the same paragraph Mr. Cathcart indicates 
to the trial court "There is going to be a little bit of 
discussion with the court about appropriate alimony for my — 
appropriate income for my client." (Tr. 5). Mr. Cathcart was 
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well aware that Charles would ask the trial court to impute a 
significant amount of additional income to his client. Mr. 
Cathcart was also aware that Charles had the children 45% of the 
time. (Tr. 96-97; Add. G). Had Charles prevailed, the child 
support figure would be significantly less than $1035-$1055. 
Charles did agree to continue to share the children as the 
parties had during their separation, Mary 55% of the time and 
Charles 45% of the time. (Tr. 3, 96-97, Add. G) Charles also 
agreed that the parties would have joint legal custody and that 
Mary would be the primary physical custodian. (Tr. 3). 
Mary's also argues that Charles' objection is belated 
because Mr. Christensen has already approved the Findings and 
Decree as to form. However, the record correctly indicates that 
the parties stipulated to use the child support guidelines. 
There is no stipulation on record regarding sole custody or to 
the amount of child support. 
Because the trial court has not made the findings under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 which requires that child support be paid 
on the joint custody schedule without specific findings to the 
contrary when visitation exceeds 25% of the nights in the year. 
(See Udy v. Udy, 893 P.2d 1097, 1099-1100 (Utah App. 1995)),to 
justify its deviation from the statute, this case should be 
reversed and remanded for further findings as to child support. 
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D. INADEQUATE FINDINGS ON DEBT ALLOCATION 
Mary cites Hill v. Hill, 869 P. 2d 963 (Utah App. 1994) in 
support of the position that a courts have been able to exercise 
discretion by awarding 87% of the marital debt to the husband. 
However, the court in Hill said, M[p]art of the reason Mr. Hill 
ended up with 87% of the debt is that he improperly included the 
entire Eduserve loan in his calculations of the debt assigned to 
him. Ms. Hill's half of the Eduserve debt became Mr. Hill's 
responsibility only upon a corresponding reduction in his alimony 
obligation. It is therefore misleading to think of it routine 
debt distribution." Id. at 966. The facts in Hill show the 
court was juggling financial responsibilities of the parties. 
The Hill case does not stand for the proposition that lop sided 
debt distributions are appropriate within the sound discretion of 
the court. 
The trial court concluded that Charles should pay 80% of the 
debt and Mary should pay 20% of the debt. (Findings paragraph 
17). The findings do not indicate how the trial court reached 
the division of debts. The trial court's division of the debts 
does not appear to reflect the parties' abilities to pay. There 
is no adjustment in the allocation of marital debt to reflect 
Charles' payment of the alimony and child support orders as there 
was in Hill. 
The trial court indicates that "the ratio of earned income" 
is 80% attributable to Charles. (Findings paragraph 9). 
However, there is no specific finding of how the trial court 
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translated proportionate earned income into a fair distribution 
of debt. Further there is no finding on how debt distribution is 
affected by the other orders of the trial court. 
Mary's net income calculations show Mary with $3300/month of 
disposable income, before adding the I.R.S. debt, compared to he 
calculations of Charles' $2880/month disposable income before 
adding the I.R.S. debt. (Add. C; Findings paragraph 35-36). 
Finally, there are no findings to explain the trial court's 
decision to place an additional burden on Charles of 80% of the 
I.R.S. debt, plus attorney's fees. 
The decree should be vacated and remanded for 
reconsideration of the debt allocation and for findings that will 
identify the specific facts the trial court considers in its 
decision. 
E. ATTORNEYS' FEES. 
Mary argues in her brief that it is sufficient that the 
trial court considered whether she had a need and whether Charles 
could afford to pay her attorneys fees. However, the trial 
court's findings say nothing more than these conclusions. 
(Findings paragraph 26). In Matter of Estate of Quinn, 830 P.2d 
282 (Utah App. 1992), the court held that M[u]nless the record 
clearly and uncontrovertedly supports the trial court's decision, 
the absence of adequate findings of fact underlying the trial 
court's decision and requires remand for more detailed findings 
by the trial court." Id. (citing Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 
474 (Utah App. 1991)). There is no finding by the trial court 
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that Mary had any attorney fee debt at the time of trial. The 
only finding was that Mary had incurred attorneys1 fees of 
$8,660.00. Further the trial court does not explain how it 
considered Mary's need in light of the trial court's substantial 
alimony award and the debt allocation. 
Mary included a $125.00/month payment for her attorney in 
the estimated expenses which appear to have been used by the 
trial court. (Add. B; Findings paragraph 32). The Findings do 
not set forth how the trial court considered the money budgeted 
for attorneys fees or how the disposable income available to Mary 
was considered in the trial court's conclusion that Mary "is in 
need of assistance with her attorney's fees." (Findings 
paragraph 26). The trial court found that Charles has the 
ability to pay 80% of Mary's attorney's fees as well as 100% of 
his own attorney's fee. (Findings paragraph 28, Tr. 127). 
By agreement of the parties, Charles cashed in the parties' 
401(k) to pay for marital debts. (Tr. 4). Consequently, he has 
no ability to pay Mary's attorneys' fees from savings. With the 
on-going monthly obligations ordered by the trial court, Charles 
is unable to meet his own expenses. (Findings paragraph 35-36; 
Add. H) 
Mary is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees on 
appeal. As properly argued in Charles's brief herein the trial 
court's award of attorney fees, child support, alimony as well as 
allocation of 80% of the debt to Charles were unsupported and an 
abuse of discretion. The trial court failed to make sufficient 
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findings to support its conclusions on any of these issues. In 
light of these deficiencies, Plaintiff is not entitled to an 
award of fees incurred in this appeal. 
The decree should be vacated and remanded, for 
reconsideration of the attorney's fee award, debt allocation and 
for specific findings supporting its conclusions regarding 
alimony and child support. 
II. CHARLES' EXPERT WITNESS WAS IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED 
A. TRIAL COURT CANNOT EXCLUDE WITNESSES 
ABSENT A COURT ORDER 
Mary's brief has no reference to statutory or case authority 
which gives the trial court the right to sanction a party by 
excluding its witness. In Barrett v. Denver and Rio Grande 
Railroad Co., Inc. 830 P.2d 291, 296 (Utah App. 1992) the court 
held that absent a court order, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 37(b)(2) does not give the trial court authority to 
"sanction a party by excluding its witnesses." 
There is no discussion at all in Mary's brief regarding this 
holding of Barrett. Mary simply argues that Barrett is 
factually indistinguishable from the present case because in 
Barrett there had been no identification of witnesses to the 
other side prior to trial but Charles had identified some 
witnesses prior to trial in this case. (Appellee's Brief pp. 24-
25). Although Mary appears to have found a fact that was 
different between the two cases, the fact is not material to the 
holding in Barrett. There was no court order in this case 
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requiring disclosure of witnesses by a certain date. 
Mary argues that there is a court rule that allows the trial 
court to exclude witnesses. (Appellee's Brief p. 25). However, 
that rule was not cited in her brief. Mary also argues that 
pursuant to the rules, Charles was required to supplement his 
answers to interrogatories within thirty days prior to trial. 
(Appellee's Brief p. 25). There is no such rule. The rule on 
supplementation requires a party to "seasonably" supplement 
expert witness lists. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 
26(e)(1). However, the thirty day pretrial discovery deadline 
requires a party seeking to conduct discovery within thirty (30) 
days of trial to seek leave of court. Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration 4-502(5). The reference in Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration 4-502(5) to all discovery responses must be 
completed thirty (30) days before trial presumably means that a 
party serving discovery must serve it in time for the responses 
to be due at least thirty (30) days before trial. There is no 
rule preventing a party from obtaining a witness closer to trial 
in the absence of a court order to the contrary. 
Mary states that failure to supplement interrogatory 
responses within thirty days prior to trial placed Charles, 
"squarely within the trial court's discretion to exclude any 
further evidence verbally his responses might disclose." 
(Appellee's Brief p.25). However, there is no rule or case law 
cited by Mary justifying this statement. The trial court's 
discretion discussed in the rule is limited to the decision of 
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whether to allow a party to conduct discovery within 30 days of 
trial. Utah Rules of Judicial Administration 4-502(5). 
The Judge indicates on the record that the rules of civil 
procedure require a party calling an expert witness to give 
timely notice of the expert to opposing counsel. The rule 
relates only to supplementing interrogatories directly requesting 
identity of expert witnesses. Even though Mary's interrogatory 
asked for "witnesses" generally and did not directly request the 
identity of expert witnesses, Charles has always been forthright 
in identifying his expert witnesses to Mary as they were 
retained. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 26(e)(1). Mr. 
Christensen did give timely notice to opposing counsel of the 
additional witness. There was no order of the trial court 
requiring witnesses to be selected and identified sooner. 
As indicated in the three pre-trial orders issued the summer 
of 1997, the trial court failed to designate any witness exchange 
date. (Add. F). The first scheduling order which set trial for 
June 14, 1997 had no instruction as to an exchange of witness 
lists. The second scheduling order, issued forty two days before 
trial, indicated that witness lists were to be exchanged 
according to the rules. However, there is no rule which gives a 
deadline for exchange of witness lists. Further, Mr. Cathcart 
never requested the trial court to set a specific date for 
exchange of witnesses. 
Charles obtained witness James White the day after the last 
pre-trial settlement conference between the parties and Judge 
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Brian. (Tr. 80-81). A letter identifying James White and the 
purpose of calling him as a witness was faxed to Mary's attorney 
two days before trial, the same day he was retained. (Tr. 80-
81). As indicated by Mary in her brief, the issue on which the 
excluded vocational expert was called to testify, Mary's earning 
potential, was "in issue before the court and before counsel from 
the day that Plaintiff's complaint was originally filed." 
(Appellee's brief p.20). Although the earning potential was at 
issue from the beginning of this case, Charles' vocational 
witness was unknown until two days before trial. 
Mr. Cathcart had time to depose either of Charles' experts. 
However, Mary did not request to depose either expert. There was 
no court order to obtain the witnesses by a certain date. 
B. ANY PREJUDICE COULD HAVE BEEN RESOLVED 
BY A CONTINUANCE. 
The day before trial, the trial court and counsel discussed 
use of the expert at trial in a telephone conference. (Tr. 80-
82, 85). The parties agreed to continue the trial so Mary could 
obtain a counter expert witness. Mr. Cathcart, after agreeing to 
a continuance, changed his mind on the grounds that the delay was 
prejudicial to his client. If there was prejudice to his client 
because the new trial date given by the clerk was too far out, 
Mr. Cathcart should have requested a sooner date from the judge. 
However, he failed to raise any such concern. On the morning of 
trial, Mr Cathcart knew Charles was going to call the expert 
witness. (Tr. 80-81). Mr. Cathcart should have moved to exclude 
18 
the witness at the beginning of the trial. Yet, he made no 
motion to exclude the witness until the end of the trial when the 
witness was called. (Tr. 79) . 
Mary argues that she is prejudiced by the late designation 
of Charles's expert because "there was a real financial need on 
the part of Mary (not to mention the need to bring closure to the 
matter)". (Appellee's Brief p. 22). The trial judge, however, 
suggested that the trial be continued and that temporary support 
be raised to alleviate any financial hardship. (Tr..81) The 
parties agreed to this. (Tr. 81-82). The need to bring closure 
to this divorce was not something more prejudicial to Mary than 
not having an expert witness was to Charles. It is Mary that 
moved from the home and filed the complaint for divorce. (Tr. 
34). Her desire to have the divorce over with is secondary to 
having a fair evidentiary hearing with all witnesses present. 
There is no other prejudice cited by Mary for a short continuance 
of the trial. 
The prejudice to the Plaintiff that the trial court found as 
a basis for exclusion of Charles' witness was that Mary would not 
be able to consult with a counter expert (Tr. 84-85). The trial 
court made no findings as to why a short continuance would not 
overcome that prejudice. Charles agreed to and was prepared to 
cooperate with all suggestions to avoid prejudice to Mary, 
including temporary increase in his support and a new trial date. 
Charles' motion to continue the trial was denied even though 
all testimony, except for the excluded witness, had been 
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received. (Tr. Ill). The trial court could have continued the 
trial to a date relatively close in time to the trial. There is 
no explanation in the trial court record as to why one witness, 
and a possibly a rebuttal witness, could not have been worked 
into the trial court's calendar at some time soon after August 
14, 1997. Previously, Counsel had agreed to continuing the case 
at the trial court's suggestion. (Tr. 80-82). 
Charles has been severely prejudiced by not having evidence 
before the trial court as to Mary's earning capacity. She has an 
MBA in marketing and many years experience using her BA degrees 
of Health and Nutrition and Dietetics. (Tr. 19). The evidence 
suggests Mary can earn more than she is currently earning. Mary 
has earned almost double her current hourly rate in her past 
employment as Food Service Director of Park City's Schools. (Tr. 
13; Add. C). She admitted that she is designing her work 
schedule so that she can be home with the children when they are 
out of school in the afternoons and on holidays. (Tr. 40, 42-
43). To finance this part-time work schedule, the trial court 
has made a monthly alimony award of $l,200/month over and above 
the $l,045/month awarded as child support to Mary. (Findings 
paragraph 35-36). 
Charles has acted in good faith. Charles has disclosed his 
witnesses as they were retained. (Tr. 80-83). There has been no 
attempt to sabotage the discovery process or to put Mary at a 
disadvantage. Charles agreed to pay increased temporary support 
while awaiting a later trial date. (Tr. 80-83). Charles simply 
20 
seeks a fair day in court to present the evidence of Mary's 
superior training and work ability rather than to bear the burden 
of her part-time work while he works long hours and takes the 
children 45% of the time. (Tr. 40-43, 96-97, Add. G). Charles 
needs a vocational expert witness to testify as to what full-time 
employment a person with Mary's credentials could obtain and at 
what level of pay the trial court could expect her to be 
employed. These issues bare directly on the amount of imputed 
income for child support and the spouses need for alimony. 
Charles is entitled to a trial with all of his witnesses before 
the trial court. 
Because the trial court lacked authority to exclude Charles' 
vocational expert witness, this case should be remanded for a new 
trial. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no application of the evidence to the trial court's 
conclusions. Charles requests this court to reverse and remand 
this case for adequate findings showing how the trial court used 
the evidence to arrive at its conclusions. 
There is no rule or statute which gave the trial court 
authority to exclude an expert witness in the absence of a court 
ordered deadline for witness designation. Charles requests this 
court to reverse this case and remand for a new trial where 
Charles' excluded witness will be permitted to testify. 
21 
DATED this 
A 
day of August 1998. 
HENRIOD, NIELSEN & CHRISTENSEN 
Steve S. Christensen 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant, 
CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF was mailed first class, postage prepaid 
on the (( day of August 1998 to: 
Terry L. Cathcart 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
380 North 200 West, #103 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
22 
ADDENDUM A 
Defendant' s Exhibi't L 
Sheetl 
[Mary and Charles Rehn 
Joint Checking Account -1 
Expenses 
Food 
Utilities/phone 
Gas-car 
Car ins. 
Med/dental 
Child care 
Clothes 
Incidental 
church 
haircuts 
misc. 
schooi/books 
Total Incidental 
Entertainment 
health club 
misc. ent. 
Total Entertainm 
rent+car 
(Total Expenses 
January 
ent 
1995 ~ 
February 
635 
240 
50 
190 
643 
___. 
60 
16 
112 
90 
282 
107 
31 
138 
1575 
4061 
March 
974 
240 
87 
643 
175 
89 
20 
35 
25 
37 
117 
103 
246 
349 
.11 Jlz? 
3852 
April 
905 
185" 
50 
- 280 
380 
160 
181 
10 
42 
52 
108 
100 
208 
1575 
4164 
May 
1000 
150 
95 
98 
50 
343 
330 
5 
39 
62 
106 
112 
80 
192 
1575 
3952 
June 
1090 
122 
110 
" 1 9 2 
__
 g 8 
290 
95 
20 
_2 _ 70 
115 
100 
78 
178 
1575 
4647 
July 
972 
" 380 
105 
260 
50 
50 
108 
90 
198 
Z ll^A 
3876 
August 
931 
T27 
90 
20 
175 
135 
28 
28 
90 
90 
ZZl57J? 
3391 
September 
1240 
125 
ZIT_ 94 
300 
23 
23 
117 
125 
242 
1575 
3725 
Ave. mo. 
865 
192 
62 
118 
174 
143 
190 
20 
19 
25 
44 
108 
94 
123 
217 
1575 
3959 
Expenses 
Food 
Utilities/phone | 
Gas-car 
Car ins. 
Med/dental 
Child care 
Clothes 
Incidentals 
church 
haircuts 
misc. 
school/boo 
Total lncid< 
— 
ks 
sntal 
: : : " _ : : : 
Entertainment | 
health club 
misc. ent. 
Total Entertainment 
rent+car 
Total Expenses J 
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ADDENDUM B 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 
PLAINTIFF'S MONTHLY EXPENSES 
Rent $ 520 
Renter's Insurance 13 
Maintenance (residence)(appliance maintenance/replacement) 50 
Food and household supplies 500 
Utilities (electricity and heat) 50 
Telephone 50 
Laundry and cleaning 50 
Clothing 150 
Medical (asthma prescriptions/allergy medications/podiatrist/optometrist) 125 
Dental (Orthodontist, Kyle's retainer/braces(?)) 50 
Medical/Dental Insurance 185 
Child care 136 
School (children and myself) 150 
Entertainment (memberships, travel, recreation, camps, sports) 345 
Incidentals (grooming, alcohol, gifts and donations) 200 
Auto expense (gas, oil, repair, insurance) 226 
Auto payments 341 
Installment payment(s) (counselor and attorney's fees) 125 
Other expenses (taxes) 50 
TOTAL: $3316 
ADDENDUM C 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 
ALIMONY COMPUTATIONS 
Plaintiff: Defendant: 
$ 1428 per month gross $ 6833 per month gross 
jc 75 net after taxes _x 75 net after taxes 
$1072 net $5125 net 
[214] [child support] [1045] [child support] 
$ 858 $4080 
1611 alimony [1611] [alimony] 
$2469 $ 2469 
Therefore, Defendant should be ordered to pay Plaintiff alimony of S 1,611 
for the length of the marriage (20 years) or until earlier terminated by law 
^ 
ADDENDUM D 
Defendant's Exhibit A 
t-r-^ ^)c '** r\L y 
TERRY L. CATHCART, #4809 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
380 North 200 West, #103 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801)295-2391 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARY J. REHN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHARLES C. REHN, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT 
OF EXPENSES 
Civil No. 96-43-00048 DA 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF D A V i S ) 
MARY J. REHN, after being duly sworn, states from firsthand knowledge\f the facts 
and circumstances that her expenses are as follows: 
EXPENSE /MONTHLY PAYMENT 
1. rent (includes renter's insurance) 
2. medical insurance 
3. medical expenses beyond insurance coverage 
4. dental expenses 
5. clothing 
20 
20 
150 
Q DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT 1 
EXPENSE 
6. vacations 
7. furniture or household furnishings 
8. automobile payments 
9. automobile insurance 
10. automobile maintenance 
MONTHLY PAYMENTT 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
automobile operation (gas, oil, etc.) 
food and household supplies 
utilities (gas, electric) 
telephone 
laundry and dry cleaning 
entertainment 
club dues 
18. other expenses: 
es, personal grooming) 
Total Expenses 
Net Monthly Income 
Net Monthly Deficit 
50 
50 
340 
74 
50 
50 
500 
100 
75 
45 
100 
60 
100 
2,359 
[850] 
1,509 
Plaintiffs Affidavit of Expenses 
Page 2 
DATED this^£^day of March, 1996. 
7 H Subscribed and sworn to before me this 2 ? - day of March, 1996 
«tf v:)o NOTAMVnMUC TERRY LCATHCART 1 J7Y~T . Jt J \ x 
^jSSi .S .r fa*- i NOTARY PUBLIC 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following named 
individual via first-class mail, postage prepaid on this 29th day of March, 1996: 
Charles C. Rehn 
4118 Saddleback Road 
Park City, UT 84060 
% ^ ~ ^ ; L Z> 
Plaintiff's Affidavit of Expenses 
Page 3 
ADDENDUM E 
Defendant's Exhibit H 
CHARLES & MARY REHN 
AFTER-TAX DISPOSABLE ANNUAL INCOME ANALYSIS 
ver 10.1c 
DESCRIPTION 
CHARLES 
REHN 
MARY 
REHN 
FILING STATUS 
EXEMPTIONS 
TOTALS WAGES 
ALIMONY RECEIVED 
LESS: ALIMONY PAID 
ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME 
LESS: STANDARD DEDUCTION (a) 
LESS: EXEMPTIONS (b) 
TAXABLE INCOME 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 
LESS NEW CHILD TAX CREDIT FOR 1998 
ADJUSTED FEDERAL INCOME TAX 
STATE INCOME TAX 
CHILD SUPPORT 
ADJUST FOR NONCASH TAX ITEMS (a & b) 
ADJUST FOR SOC. SEC. TAX PAID 
ROUNDING FACTOR 
AFTER TAX DISPOSABLE INCOME 
(SINGLE) 
SELF 
82,000.00 
(8,550.00) 
(HEAD OF HOUSE) 
SELF + 2 CHILDREN 
19,000.00 
8,550.00 
73,450.00 
(4,000.00) 
(2,550.00) 
66,900.00 
(15,874.50) 
0.00 
(15,874.50) 
(3,805.66) 
(12,364.80) 
6,550.00 
(5,076.40) 
(9.34) 
36,319.30 
27,550.00 
(5,900.00) 
(7,650.00) 
14,000.00 
(2,100.00) 
800.00 
(1,300.00) 
(842.00) 
12,364.80 
13,550.00 
(1,453.50) 
36,319.30 
(a) Standard deduction for 1996 
Head of Household $5,900, Single $4,000 
(b) Personal exemption for 1996 = $2,550 
ADDENDUM F 
Four Pretrial Orders 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
REHN, MARY J. 
-VS-
REHN, CHARLES C. 
PLAINTIFF, 
SCHEDULING ORDER AND 
TRIAL NOTICE 
CASE NO. 964300048 DA 
HONORABLE JUDGE W. BOHLING 
DEFENDANT. 
PURSUANT TO THE SCHEDULING CONFERENCE HELD ON 2/6/97 
THE FOLLOWING DATES WERE SET AND MATTERS DISCUSSED: 
1. THIS CASE IS SET FOR TRIAL ON JUNE 13, 1997 AT 9:00 A.M. 
2. ANTICIPATED TRIAL TIME IS 01 DAYS. 
3. THE CASE IS SET FOR NON JURY TRIAL 
4. ALL DISCOVERY INCLUDING RESPONSES MUST BE CONCLUDED BY 
5. ALL DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS ARE TO BE HEARD BY 
6. EXHIBIT AND WITNESS LISTS ARE TO BE EXCHANGED BY 
7. A FINAL PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD ON 
JUNE 9, 1997 AT 2:00 P .M. TRIAL COUNSEL AND CLIENTS, OR 
AN INDIVIDUAL WITH AUTHORITY TO SETTLE THIS CASE ARE TO BE 
PRESENT. OUT OF STATE PARTIES MUST BE AVAILABLE BY PHONE AT THE 
TIME OF THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE. 
8. FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE 
MAY RESULT IN A DEFAULT. 
9. THE FOREGOING DATES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FIRM SETTINGS 
AND WILL NOT BE MODIFIED WITHOUT COURT ORDER, AND THEN ONLY 
UPON A SHOWING OF MANIFEST INJUSTICE. COUNSEL ARE INSTRUCTED TO 
STAY IN CONTACT WITH THE CLERK OF THIS COURT AS THE SPM^ DATE APPROACHES REGARDING THE TRIAL 
DATED THIS 6TH DAY OF 
l £ s2 = 
I \COUNTY / $ ! 
COPIES MAILED TO PARTIES AT THE ADDRESSES IN%I&$ED $$f Tgt 
DISTRICT COUR 
ATTACHED MAILING CERTIFICATE % K^> & 
i Jl/s 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
REHN, MARY J. 
-VS-
REHN, CHARLES C. 
PLAINTIFF, 
SCHEDULING ORDER AND 
TRIAL NOTICE 
CASE NO. 964300048 DA 
HONORABLE PAT B BRIAN 
DEFENDANT. 
PURSUANT TO THE SCHEDULING CONFERENCE HELD ON 6/19/97 APPROXIMATELY 
THE FOLLOWING DATES WERE SET AND MATTERS DISCUSSED: 
1. THIS CASE IS SET FOR TRIAL ON AUGUST 14, 1997 AT 9:00 A.M. 
2. ANTICIPATED TRIAL TIME IS 01 DAYS. 
3. THE CASE IS SET FOR NON JURY TRIAL 
4. ALL DISCOVERY INCLUDING RESPONSES MUST BE CONCLUDED BY 
(AS PER RULES) 
5. ALL DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS ARE TO BE HEARD BY (AS PER RULES) 
6. EXHIBIT AND WITNESS LISTS ARE TO BE EXCHANGED BY 
(AS PER RULES) 
7. NO FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE HAS BEEN SCHEDULED. 
8. FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE 
MAY RESULT IN A DEFAULT. 
9. THE FOREGOING DATES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FIRM SETTINGS 
AND WILL NOT BE MODIFIED WITHOUT COURT ORDER, AND THEN ONLY 
UPON A SHOWING OF MANIFEST INJUSTICE. COUNSEL ARE INSTRUCTED TO 
STAY IN CONTACT WITH THE CLERK OF THIS COURT AS THE TRIAL DATE 
APPROACHES REGARDING THE TRIAL SETTING. 
11. OTHER MATTERS: MATTER WAS PRE-TRIED ON 6/9/97; NOT SET-
TRIAL DATES OF 6/13/97 & 6/24/97 WERE BUMPED/OTHER TRIALS. 
DATED THIS 3RD DAY OF JULY, 1997. 
TLED 
w 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
COPIES MAILED TO PARTIES AT THE ADDRESSES IND^JS^EOOONTTH^^f 
ATTACHED MAILING CERTIFICATE. % %. ^ § 
\ Vin<«?f # 
*'<Z^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
REHN, MARY J. 
-VS-
REHN, CHARLES C. 
PLAINTIFF, 
SCHEDULING ORDER AND 
TRIAL NOTICE 
CASE NO. 964300048 DA 
HONORABLE PAT B BRIAN 
DEFENDANT. 
PURSUANT TO THE SCHEDULING CONFERENCE HELD ON (SEE PRIOR NOTICE) 
THE FOLLOWING DATES WERE SET AND MATTERS DISCUSSED: 
1. THIS CASE IS SET FOR TRIAL ON AUGUST 14, 1997 AT 9:00 A.M. 
2. ANTICIPATED TRIAL TIME IS 01 DAYS. 
3. THE CASE IS SET FOR NON JURY TRIAL 
4. ALL DISCOVERY INCLUDING RESPONSES MUST BE CONCLUDED BY 
(SEE PRIOR NOTICE) 
5. ALL DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS ARE TO BE HEARD BY (SEE PRIOR NOTICE) 
6. EXHIBIT AND WITNESS LISTS ARE TO BE EXCHANGED BY 
(SEE PRIOR NOTICE) 
7. A FINAL PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD ON 
AUGUST 11, 1997 AT 2:00 P .M. TRIAL COUNSEL AND CLIENTS, OR 
AN INDIVIDUAL WITH AUTHORITY TO SETTLE THIS CASE ARE TO BE 
PRESENT. OUT OF STATE PARTIES MUST BE AVAILABLE BY PHONE AT THE 
TIME OF THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE. 
8. FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE 
MAY RESULT IN A DEFAULT. 
9. THE FOREGOING DATES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FIRM SETTINGS 
AND WILL NOT BE MODIFIED WITHOUT COURT ORDER, AND THEN ONLY 
UPON A SHOWING OF MANIFEST INJUSTICE. COUNSEL ARE INSTRUCTED TO 
STAY IN CONTACT WITH THE CLERK OF THIS COURT AS THE TRIAL DATE 
APPROACHES REGARDING THE TRIAL SETTING. 
11. OTHER MATTERS: (PRE-TRIAL IS SET AT JUDGE BRIAN'S RE-
QUEST) (TRIAL IS SET FOR 1/2 TO 1 DAY) 
DATED THIS 16TH DAY OF JULY, 1997. ^T"''1'''//,, 
/ ; 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
'm\ 
COPIES MAILED TO PARTIES AT THE ADDRESSES IND%TA%:D W ' m J 
HT?n MATT.TWO r R R T T F T C A T E . "%..Q^///,.,..«V\NNN ^ ^ ATTAC ED ILING CE I I  
bi compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals needing special 
accommodations fwcluding auxiliary communicative aids and services) during this 
proceeding should call Third District/Circuit Court (801)336-4451 ext 205 
? f V ^ a i r . H ^ ? ^ S f ^ f ^ m ^ commttraca'tf H^» *«x 0>«rr r^ ro«^ A /** Utah Relay Service 1-800-346-4128. 6 
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RECEIVED
 J U L 3 0 1996 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
REHN, MARY J. 
-VS-
REHN, CHARLES C. 
PLAINTIFF, 
SCHEDULING ORDER AND 
TRIAL NOTICE 
CASE NO. 964300043 DA 
H0N0RA3LS PAT B BRIAN 
DEFENDANT. 
PURSUANT TO THE SCHEDULING CONFERENCE HELD ON 7-26-96 
THE FOLLOWING DATES WERE SET AND MATTERS DISCUSSED: 
1. THIS CASE IS SET FOR TRIAL ON SEPTEMBER 24, 1996 AT 9:00 A.M. 
2. ANTICIPATED TRIAL TIME IS 01 DAYS. 
3. THE CASE IS SET FOR NON JURY TRIAL 
4. ALL DISCOVERY INCLUDING RESPONSES MUST BE CONCLUDED BY 
AS PER RULES 
5. ALL DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS ARE TO BE HEARD BY AS PER RULES 
6. EXHIBIT AND WITNESS LISTS ARE TO BE EXCHANGED BY 
AS PER RULES 
7. A FINAL PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD ON 
AUGUST 26, 1996 AT 2:00 P .M. TRIAL COUNSEL AND CLIENTS, OR 
AN INDIVIDUAL WITH AUTHORITY TO SETTLE THIS CASE ARE TO BE 
PRESENT. OUT OF STATE PARTIES MUST BE AVAILA3LE BY PHONE AT THE 
TIME OF THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE. 
8. FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE 
MAY RESULT IN A DEFAULT. 
9. THE FOREGOING DATES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FIRM SETTINGS 
AND WILL NOT BE MODIFIED WITHOUT COURT ORDER, AND THEN ONLY 
UPON A SHOWING OF MANIFEST INJUSTICE. COUNSEL ARE INSTRUCTED TO 
STAY IN CONTACT WITH THE CLERK OF THIS COURT AS THE TRIAL DATE 
APPROACHES REGARDING THE TRIAL SETTING. 
10. IF PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL ANTICIPATES THAT EVIDENCE AT TRIAL 
WILL SHOW DAMAGES OF LESS THAN $20,000, COUNSEL SHOULD PREPARE AN 
ORDER TRANSFERRING THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT. 
DATED THIS 26TH DAY OF JULY, 1996. 
I 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
COPIES MAILED TO PARTIES AT THE ADDRESSES 
ATTACHED MAILING CERTIFICATE. 
v# 
ADDENDUM G 
Defendant's Exhibit I 
June 1996 
Kids Spent Night at Charles Rehn House 
11 SXHIB\T• ' 
9&/3 Oa^pg 
July 1996 
Kids Spent Night at Charles Rehn House 
Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Sat 
21 
I "15" 
22 
29 
161 
23 
30 
17 
24 
31 
18] 
25 
CD 
< 
X 
rr 
c/) 
03 
O 
CO 
H 
CO 
3 z 
c 
QL 
CO 
CO 
CS4 
C\J 
C4 
¥ 
f 
September 1996 
Kids Spent Night at Charles Rehn House 
October 1996 
Kids Spent Night at Charles Rehn House 
November 1996 
Kids Spent Night at Charles Rehn House 
December 1996 
8 
15 
Kids Spent Night at Charles Rehn House 
Mon Tue 
9 
16 
10 11 
17 18 
Mn 
12 fife 
19 
January 1997 
Kids Spent Night at Charles Rehn House 
February 1997 
Kids Spent Night at Charles Rehn House 
March 1997 
Kids Spent Night at Charles Rehn House 
April 1997 
Kids Spent Night at Charles Rehn House 
Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu 
I 13 
20 
27 
,i 
14 
21 
| 28 
1 
April Fools Day 
15 
22 
Passover 
2 
9 
16 
23 
30 
3 
10 
17 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ H 
24^^^^^^^^^^^M 
June 1997 
Kids Spent Night At Charles Rehn House 
Sun 
1 
_ 
15 
Happy 
Father's 
D a y Fathers Day 
22 
fc 
Mon 
2 
__ 
23 
Tue 
3 
_ _ 
17 
24 
Wed 
~ 4~j 
_ 
18 
[> 
25 
Thu Fri Sat 
• 
^^^^^H 
19 ^^^^^^^^^^H 
^ | 
26 
July 1997 
Kids Spent Night At Charles Rehn House 
Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Sat 
I 20] 
I 27 
, 21 
28 
1
 22] 
29 
231 
30 
24 
31 
August 1997 
Kids Spent Night At Charles Rehn House 
Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Sat 
3 
10 
17 
24 
31 
4 
11 
18 
25 
5 
12 
19 
26 
6 
13 
20 
27 
7 
14 
21 
28 
15 
22 
29 
1 6 | 
231 
301 
mmmmmmmmJ^ 
April 1996 
Kids Spent Night at Charles Rehn House 
Sun 
7 
I Daylight Savings l^head 1 hour 
I Easter 
14 
21 
•&•- ' 
Mon 
1 
April Fools Day 
. 8 
15 
22 
Tue 
2 
I 9 
16 
23 
30 
Wed 
3 
10 
17 
24 
Thu 
4 
A\_. 
Passover 
11 
18 
25 
Fri Sa, 
. •'"•»•! 'ij."! i' 
•.•/ ' ! • ' : ' " . - s i r 
i " 
r 
May 1996 
Kids Spent Night at Charles Rehn House 
Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu 
5 
I Cinco de Mayo 
12 
Happy 
Mattel 
Ray 
| Mother's Day 
19 
6 
13 
20 
27 
[ Memorial Day (Observed) 
7 
14 
21 
28 
1 
8 
15 
22 
29 
2 
9 
16 
Ascension Day 
23 
30 
Sat 
ADDENDUM H 
Defendant's Exhibit J 
Current Expenses 
Rent - $1050/month - Exhibit A 
Car payment - $575/mo - Exhibit B 
Water - $38/month - Exhibit C 
Sewer- $28/mo - Exhibit D 
Phone - $63/month - Exhibit E 
Gas (Mountain Fuels) -$58/mo - Exhibit F 
Auto Gas/oil/repair - $100/mo - Exhibit G 
Car insurance - $142/mo - Exhibit H 
Renters insurance - $16/mo - Exhibit I 
Life Insurance - $52/mo - Exhibit J 
Medical/Vision/Dental - $214/mo - Exhibit K 
Food - $400/mo - Exhibit L 
Laundry and Dry Cleaning - $50/mo - Exhibit M 
Entertainment (clubs,social obligations,travel,recreation) - $150/mo 
Daycare - $136/mo - Exhibit 0 
Legal - $200/mo — deferred 
Motor Vdiicle Registration - $20/mo - Exhibit Q 
Maintenance(household) - $50/mo ~ deferred 
Clothing-$100/mo ~ deferred 
Incidentals - $150/mo — deferred 
—Bectric Bill - $46/mo - Exhibit X - J ?' -' 
Subtotal - $3,638 ~ -,'^ 
Current child support - $1055/mo j -^^ 
Current temporary alimony - $750/mo ' / 
Total monthly expenditures - $5443/mo 
Monthly take home pay - $4838/mo 
Current deficit - $604/mo 
